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Abstract 
In the paper, the DDoS scenario is modelled as a mathematical programming problem. The defender 
strategically utilizes the limited resources to maximize the legitimate traffic, and he can adopt packet 
marking to observe the network status. The information extracts from the marking field can help the 
defender develop a defense strategy which combines packet filtering and packet blocking. A 
Lagrangean relaxation-based algorithm is proposed to optimally solve the problem. 
Keywords: Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS), Filtering, Blocking, Packet Marking, 





The Internet has become an essential tool in today’s world. Huge financial losses can be incurred from 
even 1 hour internet downtime due to main operational server crashes due to a DDoS attack. From 
“Computer Crime and Security Survey” conducted by CSI 2008 (Richardson 2008), among all 
security incidents, the percentage of Denial of Service ranked high, despite a gradually decreasing 
trend of the past four years. In 2008, the largest reported distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack 
reached 40 gigabits per second against one single target, which is 100-fold increase from 2001. As 
can be seen from these reports, the DDoS attack is still a problem and the damage caused by it is far 
more than it can be imagined.  
As is commonly known, there are several types of DDoS attack, such as TCP connection and SYN 
flooding attack. (Mirkovic and Reiher 2004) has listed a Taxonomy of DDoS Attack and DDoS 
Defense Mechanisms. Yet, the one being addressed here is involves the attacker sending millions of 
unwanted packets in an effort to try to overwhelm a victim server (Yau et al. 2001). There are many 
approaches to defend against a DDoS attack and one effective approach is a filtering mechanism, 
which regulates the incoming traffic, both attack traffic and legitimate traffic, to a manageable level. 
Even though the filtering mechanism has been proven to be a valid solution, it leads to another 
problem: the legitimate packets might also be throttled as malicious ones, resulting in so called 
“collateral damage.” 
In order to alleviate the collateral damage and develop the optimal defense strategy, any extra data 
could be transformed into valuable information and help the defender to refine his/her defense 
strategy. To know more specific information, the source of packets should be known. 32-bit IP 
address is not accountable, because the IP address can be easily spoofed by the attacker (Stallings  
2006). Therefore, “IP traceback” is taken into consideration and combined with a filtering mechanism 
and an application-level blocking policy, which performs on the server’s side. Nonetheless, the 
preciseness of blocking depends on the marking probability. With prior information provided by IP 
traceback, the filtering remaining ratio and blocking policy can be further refined.  
There has been a lot of research focussing on packet marking (Park et al. 2007 and Goodrich 2008). 
According to these studies and the statistical results from (RFC791 2008), IP fragments constitute a 
very small proportion of the actual Internet traffic (less than 0.25 percent). And the 8-bit Type-of-
Service field is seldom used (Stoica 1999); moreover, Reverse Flag in IP protocol has not been 
predefined (Stevens 1994). From the above-mentioned, 25 modifiable bits is available as traceback 
information field. Here, the 25-bit marking field was cut into two parts, 13 bits for the first part and 12 
bits for the second part. The first part is used to recode the unique ID of the incoming interface of the 
edge router where a specific packet enters. 
In this paper, the defender utilizes these three defense schemes to learn the attack features and develop 
a corresponding defense strategy. We then apply the Lagrangean Relaxation Method with the 
combination of subgradient method (Fishe 1981) to optimally solve this problem. The remainder of 
this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a mathematical formulation of the scenario is 
proposed. In Section 3, a Lagrangean Relaxation-based solution approach is presented. The 
computational results of the experiments are shown in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 is the conclusion. 
2 PROBLEM FORMULATION 
The problem being addressed here is how the ASP’s limited resources, such as marking scheme, 
filtering mechanism and blocking policy. In order to throttle the attack traffic more precisely, the 
traceback method of a packet marking scheme is introduced into this model and formulates the 
marking rate as a cost, and which is an extra charge service provided by the ISP. With the limited 
defense budget, the defender’s objective is to maximize the legitimate traffic, i.e., to minimize the 
collateral damage caused by the DDoS attack. In order to describe our problem in a more 
comprehensive way, the related issues in defending against the DDoS attack s are considered. 
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To begin with, the marking mechanism is considered. The ASP has a table which lists the amount of 
legitimate traffic of each time zone over a period of time. Thus the ASP realizes the network utility is 
higher during the peak period and lower when off-peak period. The higher the marking rate the more 
precisely the ASP can know in which interface the malicious traffic enters and roughly the amount of 
each malicious traffic stream. Yet, the charge of the marking scheme is higher when the ASP 
subscribes a higher marking rate. The ASP can dynamically adjust the filtering rate of each interface 
on an edge router. These adjustments should be optimised, because it might lead to critical collateral 
damage, otherwise the effort to defend the DDoS attack might be in vain. Next, the “Blocking Policy” 
performed by the ASP is taken into consideration. Since the filtering cost might be too high to 
subscribe for a low rate attack. Although the blocking might have a lower monetary cost, the extra 
traffic might degrade the service quality, such as the end-to-end delay or response time, of the 
legitimate user. For these reasons, the blocking policy needs to be considered carefully.  
In this paper, we take marking costs, filtering costs and blocking costs into account. And the 
summation of all costs cannot exceed the defender’s total budget. The scenario is elaborated as 
follows. First, when network status is normal, only legitimate traffic exists and the marking scheme is 
always on at a very low probability. At this time, the defender can approximately estimate the amount 
of the legitimate traffic in each time zone and table the observation. Due to the marking scheme, the 
defender can calculate any unusual increase of attack traffic. Furthermore, the defender might raise 
the marking probability in order to learn precisely how serious the attack is and how to develop a near 
optimal defense strategy in a timely manner. After optimal calculation, the defender decides the 
filtering mechanism and blocking policy which forms a corresponding defense strategy.  
Moreover, the target network discussed here is at the Autonomous System (AS) level network 
(Magoni 2001). Since this is an operational problem, it is assumed that all edge routers are capable of 
filtering and marking. Edge routers cannot be compromised and the marking field of all packets will 
be set to default value when entering the AS by edge routers. Each edge router and each interface on 
an edge router will have a locally unique ID pre-numbered by ISP; both ISP and ASP know the ID. 
Finally, it is assumed there is a real-time communication mechanism between the ISP and the ASP 
and both the attacker and the defender have the complete information. 
The problem is described in detail and a mathematical model with specific assumptions and problem 
objective to the target network is proposed. The given parameters and decision variables are defined 
in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. In this probabilistic packet marking based filtering ratio and 
blocking probability adjustment strategy (PPM-FRABS) model, the defender utilizes these three 
defense schemes to learn the attack features and develop a corresponding defense strategy.  
 
Given Parameters  
Notation  Description  
N The index set of all nodes in an AS  
E The index set of all entry nodes, where E ⊂  N 
S The index set of all victim servers, where S ⊂  N  
Ie The index set of all interfaces on a node e, where e E∈  
vφ  The threshold of the a victim server v, where v∈S 
ˆvg  The threshold of the aggregate traffic below which the aggregate traffic is regulated to 
defend the DDoS attack for a victim server v, where v∈S 
Z The index set of all botnets  
A The attacker’s total budget  
D The defender’s total budget 
Wk The index set of all OD pairs, where the origin is node o and the destination is node d, 
where , ,eo I d S k Z∈  ∈  ∈  
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FCe The unit cost of traffic filtering of an edge router e, where e E∈  
MCe The unit cost of traffic marking of an edge router e, where e E∈  
BCv The unit cost of unmarked traffic processing of victim server v, where v S∈  
BCwv The unit cost of marked traffic processing of victim server v, where 
, kv S k Z w W∈  ∈ , ∈  
kwγ  The good traffic on an OD pair w, where kk Z w W∈ , ∈  
fΩ  The set of all discrete values, say, 0.1, 0.2, ……, between 0 to 1. 
mΩ  The set of all discrete values, say, 0.1, 0.2, ……, between 0 to 1. 
bΩ  The set of all discrete values, say, 0.1, 0.2, ……, between 0 to 1. 
xΩ  The product set of fw and mw. 
yΩ  The product set of fw, mw and bwv. 
lΩ  The product set of fw and b’v. 
nΩ  The product set of fw, mw and bwv. 
Cw The attack budget allocated on an OD pair w, where kk Z w W∈ , ∈  
ζkw (Ckw ) The maximum attack traffic, which is the linear function of an OD pair w that is a 
function of the attack budget, where kk Z w W∈ , ∈  
βkw The (real) attack traffic on an OD pair w, where kk Z w W∈ , ∈  
Decision Variables  
fw The filtering remaining ratio on an OD-pair w, where kk Z w W∈ , ∈  
mw The marking probability of on an OD-pair w, where kk Z w W∈ , ∈  
bwv The specific blocking remaining probability of a node v, where v S∈ , kk Z w W∈ , ∈  
b’v The overall blocking remaining probability of a victim server v, where v S∈  
Table 1 Given and decision Variables 
In order to reduce the complexity of the product form, four discrete auxiliary variables, which are 
used to transform the continuity of the product form into several discrete data, are introduced. Since 
the variables, , , , 'w w wv vf m b b , are all percentages, we will use different precisions as different 
adjustable units, and the adjustable unit can be smaller if needed. After variable transformation, there 
are no more than 106 combinations. Clearly, some accuracy of the original problem might be lost 
because of the discrete problem transformation, a so-called approximation approach. Yet, there is 
debate whether the trivial loss of accuracy is worth it compared to the gain in performance. Moreover, 
the class interval being addressed above is adjustable which means the accuracy is controllable. 
Considering the pricing strategy of the network operator, 0.1 has been taken as default interval. All 
the discrete variables are listed as below. 
w w wx f m=  kk Z w W∈ , ∈  
wv w w wvy f m b=  , kv S k Z w W∈  ∈ , ∈  
'wv w vl f b=  , kv S k Z w W∈  ∈ , ∈  
'wv w w vn f m b=  , kv S k Z w W∈  ∈ , ∈  
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Subject to : 
w w wx f m=  , kk Z w W∀ ∈  ∈  (IP 1.1)
1wxε ≤ ≤  , kk Z w W∀ ∈  ∈  (IP 1.2)
wv w w wvy f m b=  , ,kk Z w W v S∀ ∈  ∈  ∈  (IP 1.3)
1wvyε ≤ ≤  , ,kk Z w W v S∀ ∈  ∈  ∈  (IP 1.4)
'wv w vl f b=  , ,kk Z w W v S∀ ∈  ∈  ∈  (IP 1.5)
1wvlε ≤ ≤  , ,kk Z w W v S∀ ∈  ∈  ∈  (IP 1.6)
'wv w w vn f m b=  , ,kk Z w W v S∀ ∈  ∈  ∈  (IP 1.7)
1wvnε ≤ ≤  , ,kk Z w W v S∀ ∈  ∈  ∈  (IP 1.8)
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∈ ∈
≥ +∑ ∑  v S∀ ∈  (IP 1.13) 
w ff ∈Ω  , kk Z w W∀ ∈  ∈  (IP 1.14)
w mm ∈Ω  , kk Z w W∀ ∈  ∈  (IP 1.15)
wv bb ∈Ω  , ,kk Z w W v S∀ ∈  ∈  ∈  (IP 1.16)
'v bb ∈Ω  v S∀ ∈  (IP 1.17)
w xx ∈Ω  , kk Z w W∀ ∈  ∈  (IP 1.18)
wv yy ∈Ω  , ,kk Z w W v S∀ ∈  ∈  ∈  (IP 1.19)
wv ll ∈Ω  , ,kk Z w W v S∀ ∈  ∈  ∈  (IP 1.20)
wv nn ∈Ω  , ,kk Z w W v S∀ ∈  ∈  ∈  (IP 1.21)
The defender’s objective is to maximize the remaining good traffic by utilizing probabilistic packet 
marking in advance, which aims at providing a prior knowledge to improve the performance of the 
filtering rate adjustment and blocking probability adjustment, where the decision parameters of the 
outer problem are given. Constraints (IP 1.1) to (IP 1.8) introduce the four auxiliary variables to 
simplify the problem and all the auxiliary variables must lie in between ε and 1. Constraint (IP 1.9) 
enforces the summation of the total marking cost, total filtering cost and total blocking cost, which 
must not exceed the defender’s marker budget D. Constraint (IP 1.10) enforces the percentage of 
filtered legitimate traffic over the filtered aggregate traffic, which must exceed the threshold, vφ , for 
each victim server v. Constraint (IP 1.11) restricts the blocking probability of each OD pair w destined 
for victim server v, which must be smaller than the ratio of the summation of filtered legitimate traffic 
over the summation of filtered aggregate traffic (both ends at victim server v) in order to maintain the 
service quality. Note that the blocking probability is used when marked traffic is received by a victim 
server v. Constraint (IP 1.12) restricts overall blocking probability of each victim server v, which must 
be smaller than the ratio of the overall summation of filtered legitimate traffic over the overall 
summation of filtered aggregate traffic in order to maintain the service quality. Note that the blocking 
probability is used when unmarked traffic is received by a victim server v. Constraint (IP 1.13) 
restricts the aggregate traffic, after filtering and blocking, from  exceeding the threshold which the 
victim server v can process, thus reaching the goal of DDoS attack mitigation. Constraints (IP 1.14) to 
(IP 1.17) limits the continuous region of wf , wm , wvb , 'vb  to a discrete region. Constraints (IP1.18) to  
(IP 1.21) limits the feasible region of all the auxiliary variables. 
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3 SOLUTION APPROACH 
Heuristics are proposed to solve the problems. We adopted a LR-based heuristic for solving the PPM-
FRABS model.  
3.1 Lagrangean Relaxation 
The Lagrangean Relaxation Method was first used to solve large-scale mathematical programming 
problems during the 1970s [17]. The most important concept of this method is “decomposition”, 
which can substantially reduce the complexity and the difficulty of the primal problem. Because its 
efficiency and effectiveness in solving complicated programming problems, Lagrangean Relaxation 
has become one of the most popular tools to solve optimization problems. 
To implement LR onto this problem, these constraints, (IP 1.1), (IP 1.3), (IP 1.5) and (IP 1.7), are 
firstly transformed from the product form into the logarithm form without losing the optimality. 
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n f m b
n f m b
≤
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, ,kk Z w W v S∀ ∈  ∈  ∈  (IP 1.7) 
Secondly, some constraints are relaxed and the problem is transferred into a LR problem. Later on, the 
LR problem is further decomposed into eight sub-problems according to the eight variables, i.e. wf , 
wm , wvb , 'vb , wx , wvy , wvl ,and  wvn , each of which is solved by exhaustive search. 
3.2 Solution Approach for the PPM-FRABS Model 
Firstly, the result from sub-problems 1.2 to 1.4 is duplicated as our initial defense strategy. Second, 
the defense strategy list is quick sorted, in a descending form, according to its ratio of attack traffic to 
normal traffic and then all filtering remaining ratios are set as 1. As for the next step, each victim 
server is checked to see whether the loading is enough to process the aggregate traffic. If not, a lower 
filtering remaining ratio is set. Fourth, each OD pair is checked for the minimum threshold of the 
remaining good traffic. If it is violated, a higher marking probability or specific blocking probability 
is set. The final defense strategy is the overall blocking remaining probability, since the filtering 
remaining ratio has been decided. Finally, for each victim server, all possible overall blocking 
remaining probabilities are exhaustively tried out. Once all the optimal overall blocking remaining 
probabilities are found, the defense strategy is determined. 
4 COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
In this part, one resource-allocation heuristic and one simple algorithm are proposed for comparison 
to show that our heuristic for getting primal feasible solution is more effective. 
4.1 Experiment Results for the PPM-FRABS Problem 
The Iteration Counter Limit and Improve Counter Limit are set to 2000 and 50 respectively. The step 
size of scalar, λ , is initialized as 2 and is halved if the objective function value, ZD, is not improved 
after several times of Improve Counter Limit. As mentioned before, in order to solve the inner 
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problem, an approximation technique is implemented to make the continuous variables discrete. In 
order to observe the accuracy and efficiency under different precisions of approximation, three kinds 
of precision, 5, 10 and 20, are designed. To eliminate the interference caused by different traffic 
distribution, the traffic distribution is fixed. The Initial Good Traffic is fixed as 25000. 
Since the issue of multiple victim servers under a DDoS attack is taken into consideration, three 
different number of victim servers are designed. By means of examining different number of victim 
servers, one can hopefully develop a guideline to maintain more legitimate traffic under the limited 
budget. Figures 2 to 7 are the experiment results for the PPM-FRABS Problem. The details are 
discussed in the next section. 
Figure 2: The Remaining Good Traffic under 
Attack Budget 300000 
  
Figure 3: The Remaining Good Traffic with 





Figure 4: The Remaining Good Traffic with 





Figure 5: The Remaining Good Traffic with 





Figure 6: The Remaining Good Traffic with 





Figure 7: The Execution Time and Exponential 
Trend Line under Different 
Precision of Approximations 
(mins) 
4.2 Discussion of Results 
Figure 2 shows the solution quality of our proposed Lagrangean Relaxation-based algorithm 
compared with the resource allocation heuristic and simple algorithm, and it shows the gap between 
LRs and UBs. It is clear that our proposed heuristic performs better than both resource allocation 
heuristic and simple algorithm. Moreover, in Figure 3, we can observe the remaining good traffic 
under different total attacker’s budget. This figure illustrates the relationship between the remaining 
good traffic, attack budget and the number of victim servers. As can be seen, it shows growth and 
decline. Surely when the attack budget increases the remaining good traffic shall decrease. Yet the 
total loading of victim servers plays a critical role in this attacker-defender interaction scenario. 
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Figure 4 to Figure 6 compares the performances under different precisions of approximation. Figure 4 
shows the relationship between the Filtering Level and Marking Level; Figure 5 presents the 
relationship between the Marking Level and Blocking Level. The relationship between the Filtering 
Level and Blocking Level is illustrated in Figure 6. It can be learned from Figure 4 that ML 10 has 
better performance than ML5 and convergence happens when the precision is raised from ML10 to 
ML 20. For the remaining Figure 5 and Figure 6 one can tell that the interaction between ML and BL 
is closer than that between FL and BL. All of the Figures indicate that the more precise the 
approximation, the better the performance. 
Figure 7 illustrates the execution time of one defense strategy deployment under a specific attack 
strategy and shows the exponential trend line. Since the defender has three defense mechanisms, all of 
the precisions vary from 5 to 20. As can be seen, the execution times are distributed from 2.97 to 
88.42 minutes and the execution time rises with the increase of the precision of approximation. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This paper illustrates the scenario of a successful defense against a DDoS attack, in which the attacker 
tends to strategically allocate its attack budget to interfere the legitimate user with his/her daily 
request. That is, the attacker tries to paralyze the function by sending a huge amount of traffic, while 
the defender tries to defend against the attacker by the effective use of a filtering mechanism and 
blocking policy with the information provided by a packet marking mechanism. Ultimately, after 
several rounds of seesaw battle, an equilibrium is reached by both the attacker’s and defender’s 
strategies.  
The proposed mathematical model to describe the PPM-FRABS problem, which illuminates the 
interaction between the attacker and the defender, is the main contribution in our work. Our proposed 
algorithms can defend against various attack strategies in a reasonable time manner. Even more, the 
solution found by our proposed algorithm can be claimed as a near optimal solution. For those who 
may suffer from the threat of a DDoS attack, it is hoped that the several defense guidelines derived 
from our proposed algorithm can help them throttle the DDoS attack and minimize the collateral 
damage. This model provides guidelines for service providers, on developing a near optimal defense 
strategy based on the proposed joint defense mechanism. 
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